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Abstract 
 A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative 
process. The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. 
Participants were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments. Participants 
were not asked to reason but instead rated the sentences for liking (Experiment 1) and physical 
brightness (Experiments 2-3). Sentences that followed logically from preceding sentences were 
judged to be more likable and brighter. Two other factors thought to be linked to implicit processing, 
sentence believability and facial expression, had similar effects on liking and brightness ratings. We 
conclude that sensitivity to logical structure was implicit, occurring potentially automatically and 
outside of awareness. We discuss the results within a fluency misattribution framework and make 
reference to the literature on discourse comprehension. 
 
 
Key words: logic, beliefs, brightness, intuition, dual process theory 
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Introduction 
 
The idea that logic and intuition represent different modes of thinking has deep roots in 
philosophy and psychology, and it continues to shape theories in many cognitive and social domains 
(for a review, see Evans, 2008). According to the dual process theory of reasoning, maximizing the 
probability of computing a normatively correct response typically requires a reasoning process that is 
deliberate, effortful and time-consuming. The alternative is to use heuristics which are intuitive, 
simple and fast but often result in suboptimal performance (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; although 
see also Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC research group, 1999, for a different perspective). For 
example, in situations that require deduction, people are prone to accept conclusions based on readily 
accessible beliefs, regardless of their logical validity (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). Dual process 
theory classifies formal reasoning and the use of heuristics as Type 2 and Type 1 processes 
respectively and holds that the two types of processes differ qualitatively. It has proven surprisingly 
difficult to reach a consensus on what the critical differentiating qualities are (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013a). In the present study, we illustrate this difficulty with regard to deductive reasoning. There is 
general agreement that the ability to deduce logically correct conclusions for novel problems is a Type 
2 process (Evans & Stanovich, 2013b). In the present study, we show with the use of implicit tests 
that this reasoning ability possesses characteristics more typically associated with intuitive
1
, heuristic 
responding. 
De Neys (2012; also Handley & Trippas, 2015) offered several reasons for believing that 
reasoning may be partly intuitive. When people fail to make normatively correct judgments, implicit 
measures (response time, gaze duration) often reveal sensitivity to normatively critical information. 
When people do make normatively correct judgments, they often fail to mention critical aspects of the 
normative solution in their verbal protocols. These findings show that information relevant to 
reasoning can be activated implicitly and thus perhaps outside of awareness, characteristic of intuitive 
rather than deliberative responding.  
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Heuristics often rely on feelings of uncertain origin. For example, people tend to rate 
perceptually or semantically coherent stimuli as more recognizable, likeable and true (Reber & 
Unkeblach, 2010). One explanation for these implicit effects is provided by fluency misattribution 
accounts, which suggest that feelings that arise from a variety of sources—processing fluency, 
semantic activation, familiarity, positive affect—are difficult to differentiate. As a result, these 
feelings are often misattributed to other sources (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998, Topolinski, 
2011; Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Morsanyi and Handley (2012) used the 
fluency misattribution paradigm to investigate the possibility that deductive reasoning possesses 
elements that are intuitive and automatic. They hypothesized that if this were true, logical arguments 
should give rise to feelings of conceptual fluency even when the task does not explicitly call for 
reasoning. In the study, participants viewed sentences and were asked how much they liked them. 
Sentences that followed logically from the preceding sentences were rated as more likable. 
Presumably the enhanced fluency of logically valid sentences was misattributed to positive affect. 
Morsanyi and Handley considered the alternative explanation that liking ratings were simply 
used by participants as a stand-in for validity judgments. People may have claimed to “like” a 
statement because they reasoned that it was logically valid. In another version of the task, participants 
were shown the same sentences but this time judged their logical validity. Dissociations between 
validity and liking judgements revealed that participants were not treating the two types of judgments 
as identical. Instructions that encouraged careful reasoning improved the accuracy of validity 
judgments but had little effect on liking. Syllogistic figure and working memory capacity, both of 
which are associated with reasoning effectiveness, affected validity judgments but not liking. 
Conversely, affective priming and a manipulation that allowed participants to discount fluency cues 
affected liking but not validity judgments. These double dissociations suggest that there is a 
component of the reasoning process that occurs implicitly even in the absence of instructions to 
reason. It produces feelings that have a seemingly unconscious influence on judgments unrelated to 
logical validity. It seems resistant to factors that are known to affect Type 2 processing. In sum, this 
component of reasoning has characteristics of non-deliberative, intuitive, heuristic responding. 
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A problem with Morsanyi and Handley’s (2012) study was raised by Klauer and Singmann 
(2013; see also, Singmann, Klauer, & Kellen, 2014), who noted that in a subset of Morsanyi and 
Handley’s materials involving complex syllogisms (Experiments 2 and 4), logical validity was 
confounded with the surface content of the sentences. Klauer and Singmann found that when surface 
context was properly counterbalanced, they did not observe an effect of validity on the liking. It is 
worth noting that the simpler syllogisms used by Morsanyi and Handley did not suffer from 
counterbalancing issues. Nevertheless, given the novelty and potentially controversial nature of their 
conclusions, replication and extension of their findings is warranted. In the present study we focused 
exclusively on relatively simple reasoning problems where the effects of implicit reasoning should 
most plausibly arise. We used a new set of materials that addressed the issues raised by Klauer and 
Singmann through randomly assigning problem contents to argument structures for each participant 
individually. Our aim was to demonstrate that logical validity can have an incidental influence on 
judgements unrelated to logic. Experiment 1 replicated the findings of Morsanyi and Handley (2012) 
with ratings of liking. Experiments 2 and 3 extended the results to a task further divorced from logic, 
judgments of physical brightness. 
 
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 examined feelings of liking for sentences that either did, or did not follow 
logically from previous sentences. In addition to rigorously controlling the surface content of the 
materials, we also introduced a wider range of argument structures (conditionals and disjunctions in 
addition to syllogisms) to test the generality of Morsanyi and Handley’s (2012) findings. In addition 
to validity, the believability of the statements was also manipulated. Believability is a factor known to 
drive heuristic responding in explicit reasoning tasks (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). Believability 
can also be thought of as a form of semantic coherence, a factor known to produce positive affect. It is 
thought that feelings of semantic fluency that result from processing coherent materials are readily 
misattributed to feelings of liking (Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Whittlesea, 1993). Believability is 
therefore predicted to increase liking. This is of interest because the implicit effect of believability, a 
factor associated with heuristic responding in deduction, can be compared to the implicit effect of 
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logical validity, a factor associated with deliberate analytical responding. Also, because the 
mechanism of fluency misattribution underlies the predicted effects of both believability and validity, 
the effect of one should parallel the effect of the other. 
Method 
 Ethics statement. All experiments were approved by the ethical committee of the Science 
and Environment Faculty at Plymouth University. 
Participants. Forty-two psychology undergraduates from Plymouth University (6 males) 
participated in exchange for course credit (age range = 18 – 35, M = 21). 
Design. Logical validity (valid vs. invalid), argument believability (believable vs. 
unbelievable; note that for the conditionals this refers to the believability of the conditional statement, 
whereas for the other argument forms this refers to the conclusion), and problem type (conditionals 
vs. disjunctions vs. syllogisms) were manipulated within subjects. 
Materials. We created a unique stimulus list of 144 trials for each participant: 48 conditionals 
(24 modus ponens and 24 modus tollens), 48 disjunctions (24 affirmation and 24 denial), and 48 
simple syllogisms. Half of the modus ponens conditionals were valid (if p then q, p, therefore q) and 
half were invalid (if p then q, p, therefore not q – all negations were implicit). Half of the modus 
tollens conditionals were valid (if p then q, not q, therefore not p) and half were invalid (if p then q, 
not q, therefore p). Note that for the conditionals, half the valid conclusions were affirmations and half 
were implicit negations, and vice versa for the invalid ones. Half of the (exclusive) affirmative 
disjunctions were valid (50%: p or q, p, therefore not q; 50%: p or q, q, therefore not p – all negations 
were explicit) and half were invalid (50%: p or q, p therefore q; 50%: p or q, q therefore p). Half of 
the denial disjunctions were valid (50%: p or q, not p, therefore q; 50%: p or q, not q, therefore p) and 
half were invalid (50%: p or q, not p, therefore not q; 50%: p or q, not q, therefore not p). Finally, half 
of the syllogisms were determinately valid and half were determinately invalid (these syllogisms were 
also used by Trippas, Handley, & Verde, 2013, Experiment 1 – simple condition). Believability was 
manipulated by randomly assigning problem contents to argument structures for each participant 
(Klauer & Singmann, 2013; Trippas et al., 2013). For the conditionals and the disjunctions, the item 
contents were further developed from those used by Handley, Newstead, and Trippas (2011). 
7 
 
Examples of each of the problem types can be found in Table 1. The full set of generating contents 
can be found in the Online Supplementary Materials. 
--- Table 1 --- 
Klauer and Singmann (2013) demonstrated that it is crucial for item contents and logical 
structures to be randomized for each participant individually. To avoid issues associated with 
suboptimal randomization, and to preempt other potential heuristic confounds, we used the following 
extensive randomization procedure. Within the conditionals 24 item contents were randomly assigned 
to one of the four possible modus ponens (MP) problem cells (i.e., valid-believable, invalid-
believable, valid-unbelievable, invalid-unbelievable) and one of the four possible modus tollens (MT) 
problem cells for each participant individually for a total of 48 trials. This was done in such a way that 
there was no systematic link between the probability of an item content belonging to a certain cell 
(e.g., valid-believable) in its MP guise and it belonging to another cell (e.g., invalid-believable) in its 
MT guise. The same held true within the disjunctions, with the added constraint that p and q were 
switched around randomly half the time to ensure the factual class was not consistently presented first 
or second (e.g., for half the trials the premise would be “Either the sky is green or it is blue” rather 
than “Either the sky is blue or it is green”). For the syllogisms we randomly assigned for each 
participant half of 48 problem contents to 12 valid syllogisms (each presented twice) and the 
remaining half of the contents to 10 invalid syllogisms (each presented twice) and 4 additional invalid 
syllogisms (each presented once). For half the syllogisms the conclusion direction went from A to C 
and for the other half from C to A, and this was true for both valid and invalid syllogisms. Similarly, 
half the time the conclusion featured the “some” quantifier and half the time it featured the “no” 
quantifier, and this was the case within each validity by believability cell. Premise believability was 
controlled for using pseudo-word nonsense middle-terms (e.g., mips). Conclusion believability was 
manipulated using category membership problem contents, with 16 categories (amphibians, birds, 
boats, cars, criminals, furniture, dogs, drinks, fish, fruits, insects, reptiles, tools, trees, vegetables, 
weapons) and three members per category (e.g., for amphibians: frogs, salamanders, toads; etc). 
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Procedure. Participants were tested individually on computers running E-Prime in small 
groups of no more than 5. After providing informed consent, the participants were presented with the 
following instructions: 
 
In this experiment we are interested in how much you like various statements. 
 
You will repeatedly be presented with three sentences in succession for a short amount of 
time. Please read these sentences and indicate how much you like the final sentence on a 
scale from 1 (dislike it very much) to 6 (like it very much).  
 
1 = dislike it very much 
2 = dislike it quite a bit 
3 = dislike it somewhat 
4 = like it somewhat 
5 = like it quite a bit 
6 = like it very much 
 
When you make the liking judgement, please focus on your feeling about the statement. Don't
  think about why you like or dislike the statement, just go with your intuition and gut-feelings. 
 
Please try to use the full extent of the scale (so use all possible values from 1 - 6). 
 
For each problem trial, participants were first presented with the major premise for 2 seconds, 
then with the minor premise for 2 seconds, and finally with the conclusion and the response scale. 
After making a response, the participant was instructed to press space to advance to the next problem.  
Results 
 Analysis approach. We used a top-down Bayesian ANOVA hypothesis testing approach 
with default priors (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012) followed up with a Bayesian 
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hierarchical unequal variance signal detection theory (SDT, see e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) 
estimation approach (Kruschke, 2011; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013)
2
. One advantage of a Bayesian 
hypothesis testing approach over its frequentist alternative is that the former allows us to interpret data 
as providing evidence for the null by calculating Bayes factors.  After identifying the main effects and 
interactions which had sufficient support given the data, indices of sensitivity were estimated for each 
factor using a Bayesian hierarchical unequal variance SDT model (Morey, Pratte, & Rouder, 2008). 
Here, sensitivity refers to differences in the distribution of liking ratings between levels of a factor, 
e.g., between logically valid and invalid statements. The SDT analysis is a useful supplement in that it 
considers the whole distribution of ratings but makes no assumptions about the uniformity of the 
distributions, or the equality of their variance ratio (Heit & Rotello, 2014; Trippas, Handley, & Verde, 
2014). Conventional frequentist ANOVA and alternative implementations of Bayesian ANOVA were 
also evaluated and led to similar conclusions (see Online Supplementary Materials). 
 ANOVA. We analyzed the liking judgments using a 2 (logical validity: valid vs. invalid) x 2 
(argument believability: believable vs. unbelievable) x 3 (problem type: conditional vs. disjunction vs. 
syllogism) top down Bayes factor ANOVA with default JZS priors and a random effect for subjects to 
account for the repeated measures nature of the three factors
3
. Bayes factors (BF10; hereafter simply 
BF) were calculated by comparing the full model containing all main effects and interactions with the 
model in which the effect of interest was removed. BF > 1 indicate more evidence in favour of the 
inclusion of the effect, BF < 1 indicate more evidence against the inclusion of the effect.  
Logically valid conclusions were liked more than logically invalid ones, BF = 5.8 * 10
165
. 
Believable arguments were also liked more than unbelievable ones, BF = 1.5 * 10
193
. There was also a 
main effect of problem type, suggesting certain argument forms were liked more than others, BF = 
366. Logical validity and problem type interacted, suggesting the effect of logic on liking differed as a 
function of argument form, BF = 2.6 * 10
12
. There was evidence against the logic by belief interaction 
(BF = 0.26) and the three-way interaction (BF = 0.33). The data was uninformative with regards to the 
belief x problem type interaction (BF = 0.98). Raw means and standard deviations for the liking 
judgments per condition can be found in Table 2. 
--- Table 2 --- 
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 SDT estimation. We estimated sensitivity to each of the effects for which substantial 
evidence was found given the model and the data (logic, belief, problem type, and the logic x problem 
type interaction). We estimated da for each factor by applying a Bayesian hierarchical unequal 
variance SDT model using JAGS to the liking ratings (sensitivity estimates are based on the means of 
the hyper-distributions; see code in Online Supplementary Materials for specifics). We ran 4 chains 
with 20,000 iterations each, with 1000 samples burn-in and no thinning. For all of the reported 
analysis, all chains converged well (all Rhat < 1.10). The reported 95% highest density intervals 
(HDI) mark the span of values that are most credible and cover 95% of the distribution (Kruschke, 
2015). 
 Participants liked valid problems more than invalid ones, M da-logic = 0.89, 95% HDI [0.52 – 
1.33]. Similarly, participants liked believable arguments more than unbelievable ones, M da-belief = 
0.85, 95% HDI [0.59 – 1.14]. Participants did not credibly like conditionals more than disjunctions, M 
da-PT-CD = 0.03, 95% HDI [-0.09 – 0.15]. In contrast, there was a preference for conditionals over 
syllogisms, M da-PT-CS = 0.16, 95% HDI [0.04 – 0.28]. There was a marginal trend for disjunctions 
to be preferred over syllogisms, M da-PT-DS = 0.20, 95% HDI [-0.05 – 0.51]. We also investigated 
the logic x problem type interaction by estimating sensitivity to logic for each problem type 
individually. Participants liked valid conditionals more than invalid ones, M da-logic-conditional = 
0.81, 95% HDI [0.58 – 1.06]. Participants also liked valid disjunctions more than invalid ones, M da-
logic-disjunction = 1.37, 95% HDI [0.69 – 2.13]. Participants liked valid syllogisms more than invalid 
ones, M da-logic-syllogism = 0.53, 95% HDI [0.27 – 0.83]. 
Discussion 
 Although the task made no reference to logical validity, participants liked statements more 
when they formed part of a logically valid argument. The size of the validity effect was comparable to 
that of believability, which also enhanced liking. Much previous work has shown that the believability 
of a statement can influence explicit judgments of logical validity. According to dual process theories 
of deduction, belief bias (Evans et al., 1983) occurs when the automatic activation of semantic 
information encourages heuristic responding, a Type 1 process. Because the influence of existing 
beliefs is intuitive, it may not be surprising that believability would have an implicit effect on 
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unrelated judgments. Indeed, other factors related to semantic coherence have been shown to 
implicitly influence feelings of liking (Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Whittlesea, 1993). On the other 
hand, it seems uncharacteristic for deliberative reasoning, a Type 2 process, to have a similar implicit 
effect on unrelated judgments.    
 Morsanyi and Handley (2012), whose findings are conceptually replicated in Experiment 1, 
proposed that people are sensitive to logical structure at an intuitive level. We will examine the case 
for this in detail later. For the moment, we consider an alternative possibility. It may be that 
participants, uninstructed, decided to use normative validity as a criterion for liking. As noted earlier, 
Morsanyi and Handley offered evidence against this possibility with the observation that factors 
mediating the validity effect in an explicit reasoning task differed from those mediating the validity 
effect in the implicit liking task. In other words, participants were not treating the two types of 
judgments as identical. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that if participants were to intentionally 
deduce the validity of the statements, they might view a state of “correctness” as more likeable. The 
next experiment aimed to avoid this by using an implicit task with no plausible connection to logical 
validity. 
Experiment 2 
 
 Manipulating the ease of perceptual processing can influence unrelated judgments. For 
example, enhanced picture clarity leads to higher ratings of liking (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 
1998), and perceptual priming and text uniformity lead to increased familiarity judgments (Jacoby & 
Whitehouse, 1989; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). According to the fluency misattribution account, 
perceptual fluency produces a feeling that is ambiguous and difficult to distinguish from other internal 
signals (e.g., Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987). The corollary is that internal signals produced 
by other processes might be misattributed to perceptual processing. We hypothesized that this would 
be the case for the implicit aspects of logical validity observed in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, 
participants viewed the materials from the previous experiment but this time judged the physical 
brightness of the statements as presented on the screen. To the layman, the criteria for brightness are 
more narrowly defined than for “liking” and do not plausibly include the semantic or syntactic content 
12 
 
of the materials. To ensure an explicit focus on physical cues, brightness of the stimuli was varied 
independently of the other variables (i.e., logical validity and argument believability), and participants 
were shown examples of low and high brightness sentences to ensure an understanding of what 
constituted a correct response within the context of the experiment. Given the observed positive 
relationship between enhanced perceptual fluency and positive affect (Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman 
& Cacioppo, 2001), the findings of Experiment 1 lead to the prediction that validity (and 
believability) should encourage higher ratings of physical brightness. 
 
Method 
Participants. Forty-eight psychology undergraduates from Plymouth University (6 male) 
participated in exchange for course credit (age range = 18 – 41, M = 21). 
Design. Logical validity (valid vs. invalid), argument believability (believable vs. 
unbelievable), brightness (high vs. low), and problem type (conditionals vs. disjunctions vs. 
syllogisms) were manipulated within subjects. 
Materials. Materials were created as in Experiment 1. Brightness was manipulated by 
randomly assigning half of the problems in each logic x belief x problem type cell to be high or low 
brightness. High and low brightness trials differed in the contrast between the problem text (shades of 
grey) and the background (white). All of the text presented within a trial (including the major premise, 
the minor premise, the conclusion, and the response scale) had identical contrast levels. Stimuli were 
created by assigning a red-green-blue (RGB) value (x, x, x), with x drawn from a normal distribution 
with µ = 30, σ = 1 for high, and µ = 40, σ = 1 for low brightness. Based on pilot work, these values 
ensured that brightness judgments were possible without being trivially easy. 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually on computers under controlled lighting 
conditions in small groups of no more than 5. After providing informed consent, the participants were 
presented with examples of high and low brightness sentences (see Figure 1). The following 
instructions were presented: 
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You will repeatedly be presented with three sentences in succession for a short amount of 
time. Please read these sentences and indicate whether the final statement is high or low 
brightness on a scale from 1 (certainly low brightness) to 6 (certainly high brightness).  
 
1 = certainly low brightness 
2 = probably low brightness 
3 = guess low brightness 
4 = guess high brightness 
5 = probably high brightness 
6 = certainly high brightness 
 
The brightness differences are quite subtle, so make use of your gut feeling and intuition when 
making a judgement. Occasionally you will have to guess. Once again, make sure you do this 
on the basis of your gut feeling. 
 
Also make sure you use the full extent of the scale (so use all possible values from 1 - 6). 
 
There will be a short memory test at the end of the experiment to check whether you read all 
the sentences, so make sure that you read all of them. 
 
--- Figure 1--- 
Results 
ANOVA. We analysed the brightness judgments using a 2 (logical validity: valid vs. invalid) 
x 2 (argument believability: believable vs. unbelievable) x 2 (brightness: high contrast vs. low 
contrast) x 3 (problem type: conditional vs. disjunction vs. syllogism) top down Bayes factor ANOVA 
with default JZS priors and a random effect for subjects as in Experiment 1. Logically valid 
conclusions were rated as more bright than invalid ones, BF = 1.3 * 10
13
. Believable arguments were 
also rated as more bright than unbelievable ones, BF = 2.8 * 10
9
. High contrast conclusions were 
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judged as brighter than low contrast conclusions, BF = 9.0 * 10
84
. There was substantial evidence 
against inclusion of the remaining effects (all BF < 0.13). Raw means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 4. 
--- Table 4 --- 
SDT estimation. We estimated sensitivity to each of the components in favour of which 
substantial evidence was found (logic, belief, brightness) using a Bayesian hierarchical UVSDT 
model. Participants judged valid arguments as physically brighter than invalid arguments, M da-logic 
= 0.24, 95% HDI [0.04 – 0.46]. Participants judged believable arguments as brighter than 
unbelievable arguments, M da-belief = 0.21, 95% HDI [0.03 – 0.41]. As would be expected, 
participants judged high brightness problems as brighter than low brightness problems, M da-
brightness = 0.68, 95% HDI [0.34 – 1.12]. 
Discussion 
 Participants judged valid statements which followed logically from the preceding sentences as 
being physically brighter than invalid statements. As in the previous experiment, there was a parallel 
effect of believability. Believable statements were judged to be brighter than unbelievable statements. 
The implicit influence of logical validity on a judgment whose criteria involved purely physical 
characteristics is surprising. However, the results are conceptually consistent with those of 
Experiment 1 and extend them to a task that is even further removed from the explicit requirement to 
reason logically. Experiment 3 sought to replicate the brightness findings alongside a manipulation of 
affect that, like believability, was predicted to influence brightness judgments. 
Experiment 3 
 Theories of embodied emotion hold that adopting a facial expression is sufficient to produce 
its associated affective state. Because people are typically unclear about the source of the affect, it is 
readily misattributed to an external source. For example, Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) found 
that people rated cartoons as funnier when they held a pen between their teeth (facilitating muscles 
responsible for smiling) than when they held it between their lips. Verde, Stone, Hatch and Schnall 
(2010) found that the same manipulation of expression led people to judge words as more familiar.  
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In Experiments 1 and 2, the manipulation of believability served to demonstrate that a factor known to 
drive heuristic responding can implicitly influence liking and brightness judgements. The parallel 
effects of believability and logical validity suggest that like the former, the latter might stem from a 
process possessing heuristic, intuitive qualities. In Experiment 3, the manipulation of facial expression 
was meant to serve a similar function. The misattribution of affective feelings produced by facial 
expression is believed to result from intuitive heuristics that people use to interpret ambiguous 
internal signals. Finding parallel effects on brightness ratings of expression and logical validity might 
be suggestive about the qualities of the process responsible for the latter effect. 
Method 
 Participants. Seventy-four participants sampled from the population in Plymouth 
participated in exchange for a small fee (age range = 18 – 70, M = 31). 
Design. Logical validity (valid vs. invalid), argument believability (believable vs. 
unbelievable), brightness (high vs. low), and argument type (conditionals vs. disjunctions vs. 
syllogisms) were manipulated within subjects. Simulated smiling (smile-facilitation vs. smile-
inhibition) was manipulated between subjects. Participants were randomly assigned to the facilitation 
(N = 37) or the inhibition (N = 37) condition. One person dropped out during the experiment because 
they struggled with the brightness judgement task. 
 Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2, with the exception that 
people were asked to put a pen between either their lips or their teeth for the duration of the 
experiment. The experimenter demonstrated to each participant exactly how to put the pen in their 
mouth. Participants were allowed breaks between trials but were instructed to put the pen back in the 
correct position upon continuing. The experimenter monitored pen position throughout the study. 
Results 
 ANOVA. We analysed the brightness judgments using a 2 (logical validity: valid vs. invalid) 
x 2 (argument believability: believable vs. unbelievable) x 2 (brightness: high contrast vs. low 
contrast) x 3 (problem type: conditional vs. disjunction vs. syllogism) x 2 (simulated smiling: smile-
facilitation vs. smile-inhibition) top-down Bayes factor ANOVA with default JZS priors and a 
random effect for participants to account for the mixed nature of the design  Logically valid 
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conclusions were rated as brighter than logically invalid ones, BF = 3.6 * 10
15
. Believable arguments 
were rated as brighter than unbelievable ones, BF = 7720. High contrast sentences were rated as 
brighter than low contrast ones, BF = 3.0 * 10
77
. With the exception of the simulated smiling x 
brightness interaction (BF = 1.4) and the simulated smiling x belief interaction (BF = 0.50), for which 
the data was uninformative, there was strong support in favour of the null for all remaining effects 
(BFs < 0.12). Means and standard deviations of the brightness judgments can be found in Table 3. 
 Given our a priori interest in the effect of simulated smiling and the inconclusive evidence for 
several interactions which included simulated smiling as a component, we investigated the 
manipulation in more detail. A Bayes factor contingency table analysis of independence assuming 
independent multinomial distributions was run to compare the distribution of brightness ratings for the 
simulated smiling and the simulated frowning conditions. The analysis suggested brightness ratings 
were distributed in differently in both conditions, χ2(5) = 72.6, BF = 8.5 * 108. 
--- Table 3 --- 
 SDT estimation. Using a Bayesian hierarchical UVSDT model, we estimated sensitivity to 
each of the components for which strong evidence was found in the ANOVA (logic, belief, 
brightness). Simulated smiling was assessed using a Bayesian ordered probit regression given its 
between subjects nature (cf., Kruschke, 2015). Participants’ judged valid arguments as more 
physically bright than invalid ones, M da-logic = 0.30, 95% HDI [0.03 – 0.60]. There was a marginal 
trend for participants to judge believable arguments as brighter than unbelievable ones, M da-belief = 
0.24, 95% HDI [-0.10 – 0.64] (77% HDI ]0 – .36]). High brightness sentences were judged as brighter 
than low brightness sentences, M da-brightness = 1.42, 95% HDI [0.28 – 3.49]. Finally, a Bayesian 
ordered probit regression demonstrated that the effect size of simulated smiling credibly differed from 
0, M d = 0.11, 95% HDI [0.07 – 0.16]. 
Discussion 
 Replicating the key result of Experiment 2, logically valid statements were judged to be 
physically brighter than their invalid counterparts. Believability and facial expression (simulated 
smiling) also tended to influence perceived brightness, although the former was only marginal, and 
exclusion of the latter from the best fitting model suggests that it is a weaker effect. 
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General Discussion 
 Dual process theory has been able to accommodate a range of disparate phenomena within a 
common framework, one which draws converging support from other domains of cognition and 
neuroscience (Evans, 2008). However, the fundamental question regarding which qualities distinguish 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes remains a matter of debate (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a). According to 
the dual process view, the computation of logical validity requires deliberation, time and cognitive 
control. Heuristic responses, in contrast, are intuitive, fast, and often automatic. We examined this 
dichotomy using implicit tests of reasoning. Participants viewed sentences containing inherent logical 
structure. They were not asked to reason about the sentences but instead judged simply how much 
they liked them (Experiment 1) or how bright they appeared on the screen (Experiments 2 and 3). 
Sentences that followed logically from the preceding sentences were rated as more likeable and 
judged to be brighter than sentences that were logically invalid. The implicit sensitivity to logical 
structure revealed in judgments unrelated to reasoning suggests something about the nature of the 
reasoning process. Although ostensibly a Type 2 process, reasoning does not seem to be exclusively 
deliberative but instead possesses some qualities typically associated with intuitive, heuristic 
processes. 
 Heuristics tend to be non-deliberative because they are implemented quickly, sometimes 
automatically, and because people may have limited insight about the source of these heuristics. An 
example is the heuristic of using the processing fluency of a stimulus to infer other, unrelated 
properties (for an alternative example in terms of retrieval fluency, see Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & 
Reimer, 2008). Lack of insight into this process is suggested by the fact that feelings of fluency can be 
misinterpreted in different ways depending on the context (e.g., as feelings of familiarity, liking, 
brightness; Mandler et al., 1987). Moreover, people are more likely to make use of the heuristic when 
not aware of the source of fluency. When made aware of the source, they correctly reject fluency as 
irrelevant to the judgment at hand (Goldinger & Hansen, 2005; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Schwarz 
& Clore, 1983; Whittlesea, 2002). In the present study, we know that participants understood the 
brightness task because they were able to differentiate different levels of text-to-background contrast 
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with above-chance accuracy. There is no plausible reason to allow logical validity to inform 
judgments of physical brightness. Nevertheless, there was a validity effect. It seems reasonable to 
infer that participants lacked insight or awareness of the implicit effects of logical structure. Had they 
been aware, they should have rejected the information as irrelevant. 
 Along with logical validity, sentence believability and facial expression also influenced 
judgments of liking and brightness. The notion that participants were deliberately basing their 
judgments on such a disparate collection of (irrelevant) information seems implausible. An alternative 
explanation draws on a large body of work investigating fluency misattribution. Psychological 
processes produce signals that are often ambiguous and require interpretation. Other work has shown 
that positive affect produced by an unrelated source can be misinterpreted as perceptual clarity or 
familiarity (Strack et al., 1988; Verde et al., 2010), and feelings associated with conceptual coherence 
can be misinterpreted as feelings of liking (Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Whittlesea, 1993). The 
implicit effects of facial expression and believability therefore have precedent, although our findings 
are novel with respect to the materials and tasks used. Aside from Morsanyi and Handley’s (2012) 
earlier study, the implicit effect of validity is novel. We speculate that comprehending logical validity, 
much like comprehending conceptual cohesion, produces feelings that are ambiguous and open to 
misinterpretation. The implication is that the reasoning process, at some level, produces output that is 
opaque to understanding or introspection.  
Although participants were not instructed to make logical deductions while reading the 
sentences, we cannot rule out the possibility that some may have done so spontaneously. This would 
not change the conclusions drawn so far. Whether or not reasoning was instigated deliberately, the 
implicit effects of reasoning seem to be non-deliberate. However, there are other issues for which the 
question of deliberate reasoning is relevant. Morsanyi and Handley (2012) proposed that the implicit 
effect of logical structure was evidence that the reasoning process itself was at least partly intuitive. 
They noted that the validity effects observed in the explicit and implicit reasoning tasks responded 
differently to various manipulations. For example, different instructions (known to influence explicit 
reasoning) mediated the validity effect in the explicit but not the implicit task. Conversely, fluency 
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cues (known to influence heuristic responding) mediated the validity effect in the implicit but not the 
explicit task.  
Although we did not have an explicit reasoning condition for direct comparison, post-hoc 
examination of response latencies revealed a pattern atypical of explicit reasoning performance. 
Deliberate reasoning, being slow and effortful, is less accurate under time pressure (Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005; Trippas et al., 2013). This would lead us to expect that, if people had been reasoning 
deliberately, the fastest responses in the implicit task would show the weakest, or even no effect of 
validity. Combining data from Experiments 2 and 3, the brightness judgments were divided into faster 
(M = 1.5 s) and slower (M = 3.8 s) responses via a median split on response latencies. A 2 (conclusion 
validity: valid vs. invalid) x 2 (response speed: faster vs. slower) Bayes factor ANOVA showed that 
there was no evidence in favour or against a logic x response speed interaction, BF = 1.28. 
Nevertheless, we conducted follow-up analyses which indicated that the effect of logic on brightness 
judgements was present for both the faster (M da-logic-quick = 0.17, 95% HDI = [0.13 – 0.21]) and 
slower responses (M da-logic-slow = 0.13, 95% HDI = [0.08 – 0.17]). Contrary to what would be 
expected if the validity effect was based on deliberate reasoning, the effect was descriptively larger 
for the faster responses.  
These differences lead us to believe that whatever drives sensitivity to logical validity in the 
implicit tasks, it is only a component of the explicit reasoning process. Explicit reasoning may be 
largely deliberative and resource-intensive, but it may include components that are non-deliberative 
and more intuitive. There is some evidence from the larger literature on reasoning models that speaks 
to this idea. We already noted De Neys’ (2012) discussion of the finding that people appear to be 
intuitively sensitive to the conflict between formal norms such as probability theory and heuristic 
factors such as stereotypes, but often unable to articulate critical aspects of the reasoning process, 
such as this conflict detection. These findings led to the proposal of a “logical intuitions” model of 
reasoning according to which people have some degree of intuitive sensitivity to all formal norms. 
According to this model, the analytic-heuristic conflict is always detected, but formal responses are 
not made because it is not inhibited. On the other side of the spectrum resides the “default-
interventionist” model of reasoning discussed by Evans and Stanovich (2013). According to this 
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model, heuristic considerations always precede potential analysis due to the autonomous nature of the 
former and the necessity for working memory involvement of the latter. Occasional failures to detect 
the conflict (i.e., monitoring failures) are considered one of the main culprits for heuristic responding. 
Other possible contenders tread the middle ground (e.g., Handley & Trippas, 2015; Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015; Sloman, 1996; Thompson, Prowse-Turner, & Pennycook, 2013). 
According to Handley and Trippas’ “parallel processing” model, for instance, intuition and 
deliberation act in a parallel, race-like fashion, simultaneously integrating the various problem 
components (e.g., structure and knowledge) that are present during the task at hand. The reason why 
occasionally heuristic considerations outweigh analysis and vice versa is determined by features such 
as the complexity of these components and the ease with which they are processed. Our 
demonstration of implicit sensitivity to some–relatively simple–logical structures is consistent with 
this latter account. Whether implicit sensitivity to more complex formal norms will also arise, as 
predicted by the logical intuitions model, remains to be seen (see Handley & Trippas, 2015, for a 
more detailed discussion of these and several other reasoning models).  
We have proposed that valid arguments are associated with increased fluency, but as yet we 
can only speculate on the mechanism that brings this about. Theories of discourse comprehension 
such as Kintsch’s (1988) construction-integration model suggest that readers implicitly construct 
situational models through associations and automatic inferences. It may be more difficult to create 
coherent semantic models of invalid arguments, perhaps because they describe impossible situations. 
Morsanyi and Handley (2012) offered an explanation along these lines for their liking judgment 
results. They proposed that the ease with which the concluding statement of a valid argument fits with 
the model constructed from earlier statements produces a sense of fluency that is then misattributed to 
another source. Whether fluency is tied to the ease of creating any coherent semantic model, or more 
specifically to the ability to create a logically coherent model, is an interesting question for future 
investigation. Some support for the latter comes from a study by Lea, O'Brien, Fisch, Noveck, and 
Braine (1990) in which participants read narratives containing propositional chains, e.g.:  
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Jerry thought: “I would like to wear either my checkered or my striped shirt. Of course, if I 
wear my striped shirt I’ll have to wear my matching blue trousers”. Jerry then discovered that 
his striped shirt was wrinkled.  
Later, participants preferred sentences which suggested that they drew logically valid inferences (e.g., 
Jerry thought: “I guess I won’t have to look for my blue trousers then”) over sentences that were also 
plausible within the situational narrative but logically invalid (Jerry thought: “I guess I’d better start 
looking for my blue trousers”). Participants seemed to have generated the logical conclusions but 
were not aware of having done so. 
 The invalid arguments used in our study were determinately invalid, meaning that it is 
impossible to construct a situation model in which the conclusion holds given the premises. It would 
be useful to compare these with indeterminately invalid arguments for which it is possible to create a 
model that fits the conclusion. If fluency is linked simply to the ease of creating a coherent model, the 
validity effect might not be observed in the latter case whereas it would be observed in both cases if 
fluency is linked to logical validity
4
. We should emphasize that either possibility is consistent with the 
proposal that sensitivity to logical structure can arise in ways that defy easy characterization as a 
strictly conscious, deliberative Type 2 process. 
 
 
 
 
  
22 
 
References 
De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and Conflict: A Case for Logical Intuitions. Perspectives on Psychological
 Science, 7, 28-38. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2008). Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition.
 Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255-278. 
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Curtis-Holmes, J. (2005). Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for
 the dual process theory of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 11, 382–389.
 doi:10.1080/13546780542000005 
Evans, J. St. B. T. & Stanovich, K. E. (2013a). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing
 the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 223-241. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. & Stanovich, K. E. (2013b). Theory and Metatheory in the Study of Dual
 Processing: Reply to Comments. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 263-271. 
Evans, J. St. B. T., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in
 syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11, 295–306. 
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & the ABC Research Group. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us
 smart. New York: Oxford University Press 
Goldinger, S. D. & Hansen, W. A. (2005). Remembering by the seat of your pants. Psychological
 Science, 16, 525-529. 
Handley, S. J., & Trippas, D. (2015). Dual processes, knowledge, and structure: A critical evaluation
 of the default interventionist account of biases in reasoning and judgement. Psychology of
 Learning and Motivation, 62. 
Handley, S. J., Newstead, S. E., & Trippas, D. (2011). Logic, Beliefs, and Instruction: A Test of the
 Default Interventionist Account of Belief Bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
 Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43. 
Heit, E., & Rotello, C. M. (2014). Traditional difference-score analyses of reasoning are flawed.
 Cognition, 131, 75-91. 
Hertwig, R., Hertzog, S., Schooler, L., & Reimer, T. (2008). Fluency Heuristic: A Model of How the
 Mind Exploits a By-Product of Information Retrieval. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
 Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34, 1191-1206. 
Jacoby, L. L., & Whitehouse, K. (1989). An illusion of memory: False recognition influenced by
 unconscious perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118, 126-135. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Kintsch, W. (1988). The role of knowledge in discourse comprehension: A construction-integration
 model. Psychological Review, 95, 163-182. 
Klauer, K. C., & Singmann, H. (2013). Does Logic Feel Good? Testing for Intuitive Detection of
 Logicality in Syllogistic Reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
 and Cognition, 39, 1265-1273. 
Kruschke, J. K. (2011). Doing Bayesian Data Analysis: A Tutorial with R and BUGS. Burlington,
 MA: Academic Press. 
23 
 
Lea, R. B., O'Brien, D. P., Fisch, S. M., Noveck, I. A., & Braine, M. D. (1990). Predicting
 propositional logic inferences in text comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language,
 29(3), 361-387. 
Lee, M. D., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2013). Bayesian Modeling for Cognitive Science: A Course.
 Cambridge University Press.Practical 
Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detection theory: A user's guide (2nd ed.). Mahwah,
 NJ:Erlbaum. 
Mandler, G., Nakamura, Y., & Van Zandt, B. J. S. (1987). Nonspecific Effects of Exposure on Stimuli
 That Cannot Be Recognized. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
 Cognition, 13, 646-648. 
Morsanyi, K, & Handley, S. J. (2012). Logic Feels So Good-I Like It! Evidence for Intuitive
 Detection of Logicality in Syllogistic Reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
 Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38, 596-616. 
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015). What makes us think? A three-stage dual-
 process model of analytic engagement. Cognitive Psychology, 80, 37-72. 
Reber, R., & Unkelbach, C. (2010). The Epistemic Status of Processing Fluency as Source for
 Judgments of Truth. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 563-581. 
Reber, R., Winkielman, P., & Schwarz, N. (1998). Effects of perceptual fluency on affective
 judgments. Psychological Science, 9, 45-48. 
Reverberi, C., Pischedda, D., Burigo, M., & Cherubini, P. (2012). Deduction without awareness. Acta
 Psychologica, 139, 244-253. 
Rouder, J. N., Morey, R. D., Speckman, P. L., & Province, J. M. (2012). Default Bayes factors for
 ANOVA designs. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 56, 356-374. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative
 and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45,
 513-523. 
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). Inhibiting and Facilitating Conditions of the Human
 Smile: A Nonobtrusive Test of the Facial Feedback Hypothesis. Journal of Personality and
 Social Psychology, 54, 708-777. 
Topolinski, S. & Strack, F. (2009). The analysis of intuition: Processing fluency and affect in
 judgements of semantic coherence. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 1465-1503. 
Topolinski, S. (2011). A process model of intuition. European Review of Social Psychology, 22, 274
 315. 
Singmann, H., Klauer, K. C., & Kellen, D. (2014). Intuitive Logic Revisited: New Data and a
 Bayesian Mixed Model Meta-Analysis. PLOS ONE. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094223 
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning. Psychological Bulletin,
 119, 3-22. 
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011). Intuition, reason, and
 metacognition. Cognitive Psychology, 63, 107-140. 
24 
 
Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., & Verde, M. F. (2013). The SDT Model of Belief Bias: Complexity,
 Time, and Cognitive Ability Mediate the Effects of Believability. Journal of Experimental
 Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39, 1393-1402. 
Verde, M. F., Stone, L. K., Hatch, H. S., & Schnall, S. (2010). Distinguishing between mnemonic and
 attributional sources of familiarity: Positive emotion bias as a case study. Memory &
 Cognition, 38, 142-153.  
Whittlesea, B. W. A. (1993). Illusions of familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
 Memory, & Cognition, 19, 1235-1253. 
Whittlesea, B. W. A. (2002). Two routes to remembering (and another to remembering not). Journal
 of Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 325-348. 
Whittlesea, B.W.A., & Leboe, J.P. (2003). Two fluency heuristics (and how to tell them apart). The
 Journal of Memory and Language, 49, 62-79. 
Winkielman, P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Mind at Ease Puts a Smile on the Face:
 Psychophysiological Evidence That Processing Facilitation Elicits Positive Affect. Journal of
 Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 989-1000. 
25 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. 
Examples of the materials used in Experiments 1-3 
Problem Type Valid Invalid 
 Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Conditionals     
Modus Ponens P1: If a child is crying [p], 
then it is sad [q] 
P2: A child is crying [p] 
C: The child is sad [q] 
P1: If a child is crying [p], 
then it is happy [q] 
P2: A child is crying [p] 
C: The child is happy [q] 
P1: If a child is crying [p], 
then it is happy [q] 
P2: A child is crying [p] 
C: The child is sad [¬q] 
P1: If a child is crying [p], 
then it is sad [q] 
P2: A child is crying [p] 
C: The child is happy [¬q] 
Modus Tollens P1: If a child is crying [p], 
then it is sad [q] 
P2: A child is happy [¬q] 
C: The child is laughing [¬p] 
P1: If a child is laughing [p], 
then it is sad [q] 
P2: A child is happy [¬q] 
C: The child is crying [¬p] 
P1: If a child is laughing [p], 
then it is sad [q] 
P2: A child is happy [¬q] 
C: The child is laughing [p] 
P1: If a child is crying [p], 
then it is sad [q] 
P2: A child is happy [¬q] 
C: The child is crying [p] 
Disjunctions     
Affirmation P1: Either the sky is blue [p] 
or it is green [q] 
P2: The sky is blue [p] 
C: The sky is not green [¬q] 
P1: Either the sky is blue [p] 
or it is green [q] 
P2: The sky is green [q] 
C: The sky is not blue [¬p] 
P1: Either the sky is blue [p] 
or it is green [q] 
P2: The sky is green [q] 
C: The sky is blue [p] 
P1: Either the sky is blue [p] 
or it is green [q] 
P2: The sky is blue [p] 
C: The sky is green [q] 
Denial P1: Either the sky is blue [p] 
or it is green [q] 
P2: The sky is not green [¬q] 
C: The sky is blue [p] 
P1: Either the sky is blue [p] 
or it is green [q] 
P2: The sky is not blue [¬q] 
C: The sky is green [p] 
P1: Either the sky is blue [p] 
or it is green [q] 
P2: The sky is not blue [¬p] 
C: The sky is not green [¬q] 
P1: Either the sky is blue [p] 
or it is green [q] 
P2: The sky is not green [¬q] 
C: The sky is not blue [¬p] 
Syllogisms P1: All wines are mips 
P2: No mips are tools 
C: No wines are tools 
P1: All wines are mips 
P2: No mips are drinks 
C: No wines are drinks 
P1: All wines are mips 
P2: No mips are drinks 
C: Some wines are drinks 
P1: All wines are mips 
P2: No mips are tools 
C: Some wines are tools 
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Table 2.  
Experiment 1: Liking judgements per condition 
Problem Type Valid Invalid 
 Believable Unbelievable Total Believable Unbelievable Total 
Conditional 4.67 (1.48) 3.51 (1.73) 4.09 (1.71) 3.32 (1.72) 2.32 (1.49) 2.82 (1.68) 
Disjunction 4.96 (1.33) 3.35 (1.87) 4.16 (1.81) 3.28 (1.79) 2.10 (1.39) 2.69 (1.71) 
Syllogism 4.16 (1.51) 2.99 (1.61) 3.58 (1.67) 3.54 (1.63) 2.24 (1.27) 2.89 (1.60) 
Note. Means (standard deviations). 
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Table 3.  
Experiment 2: Brightness judgments per condition 
Problem 
Type 
Logic Belief Brightness 
Valid Invalid Believable Unbelievable High  Low  
Conditional 3.96 (1.46) 3.71 (1.47) 3.99 (1.45) 3.68 (1.48) 4.18 (1.44) 3.49 (1.41) 
Disjunction 4.01 (1.46) 3.64 (1.52) 3.94 (1.48) 3.72 (1.52) 4.14 (1.50) 3.52 (1.45) 
Syllogism 3.88 (1.43) 3.69 (1.49) 3.87 (1.43) 3.70 (1.48) 4.13 (1.44) 3.43 (1.39) 
Total 3.95 (1.45) 3.68 (1.49) 3.93 (1.45) 3.70 (1.49) 4.15 (1.46) 3.48 (1.42) 
Note. Means (standard deviations). 
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Table 4.  
Experiment 3: Brightness judgments per condition 
Problem 
Type 
Logic Belief Brightness Pen condition 
Val Inval Bel Unbel High Low Fac Inh 
Cond 4.02 
(1.49) 
3.84 
(1.58) 
3.98 
(1.52) 
3.89 
(1.56) 
4.19 
(1.51) 
3.68 
(1.52) 
3.97 
(1.57) 
3.90 
(1.50) 
Disj 4.00 
(1.56) 
3.69 
(1.58) 
3.95 
(1.56) 
3.74 
(1.59) 
4.11 
(1.56) 
3.58 
(1.55) 
3.91 
(1.60) 
3.78 
(1.55) 
Syll 3.99 
(1.50) 
3.76 
(1.53) 
3.93 
(1.49) 
3.81 
(1.54) 
4.14 
(1.51) 
3.61 
(1.48) 
3.97 
(1.55) 
3.78 
(1.49) 
Tot 4.00 
(1.56) 
3.76 
(1.52) 
3.95 
(1.52) 
3.81 
(1.57) 
4.14 
(1.53) 
3.62 
(1.52) 
3.95 
(1.57) 
3.82 
(1.52) 
Note. Means (standard deviations). 
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List of Figures 
 Figure 1. Screenshot from the experiment. High brightness sentences had red-green-blue (RGB) 
values around (30, 30, 30), low brightness sentences had RGB values around (40, 40, 40). All 
sentences were presented against a white (255, 255, 255) background. 
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Notes 
1. We use “intuitive” to indicate the quality of being non-deliberative and at least partly opaque to 
conscious understanding or introspection. Automaticity is a possible but not necessary component of 
this quality. 
2. In all three experiments, the use of traditional frequentist and alternative Bayesian analyses 
produced the same conclusions. These alternative analyses can be found in the Supplementary 
Materials. 
3. We used the anovaBF() function from the BayesFactor R package with settings rscaleFixed = 
“medium” and whichModel = “top”. The exact syntax can be found in the online supplementary 
materials. JAGS code for the SDT model can also be found in the online supplement. 
4. We are grateful to Karl Cristoph Klauer for proposing this experiment. 
 
 
 
